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Abstract
The Theory of neural Cognition (TnC) states that the brain
does not process information, it only represents informa‐
tion (i.e., it is 'only' a memory). The TnC explains how a
memory can become an actor pursuing various goals, and
proposes explanations concerning the implementation of a
large variety of cognitive abilities, such as attention,
memory, language, planning, intelligence, emotions,
motivation, pleasure, consciousness and personality. The
explanatory power of this new framework extends further
though, to tackle special psychological states such as
hypnosis, the placebo effect and sleep, and brain diseases
such as autism, Alzheimer’s disease and schizophrenia.
The most interesting findings concern robotics: because the
TnC considers the cortical column to be the key cognitive
unit (instead of the neuron), it reduces the requirements for
a brain implementation to only 160,000 units (instead of 86
billion). A robot exhibiting human-like cognitive abilities is
therefore within our reach.
Keywords Self-organizing Maps, Cognitive Abilities,
Consciousness, Artificial Intelligence, Robot-sitting
1. Introduction
As  long  as  we  consider  neurons  to  be  important  ele‐
ments in cognition, we can regard the cortex as the most
important  structure,  since  it  amounts  for  about  82% of
the human brain mass,  even if  it  holds only 19% of all
neurons  [1].  The  human  species  differs  from  other
primates; with smaller bodies but larger brains than great
apes, it boasts a brain five to seven times 'too large' for
its body size [2]. It is therefore logical to begin this paper
by investigating cortical organization, in order to unravel
the secrets of cognition (Section 2). Section 3 goes on to
explain how a hierarchical memory is able to act, through
the  synergy of  pairs  of  cortical  maps.  Complex  behav‐
iours are easily generated, with the additional help of the
time and space indexes  provided by the hippocampus.
The various types  of  memory are  explained relative  to
their use of these indexes. Personality traits are defined
by near-permanent cortical column activations.
In Section 4, we present the dynamics of this hierarchy
of cortical maps and answer questions like “how many
data  are  required for  the  self-organization  of  a  map?”.
The cortical organization required to learn orthographic
reading skills is modelled by six successive cortical levels,
and  illustrates  the  implication  of  additional  learning
strategies,  such  as  the  novel  'palimpsest  learning'
strategy.  Section  5  is  devoted  to  endogenous  and
exogenous  attention  orientation,  a  perfect  occasion  to
discuss several of the side effects of a hierarchy of self-
organizing  maps,  such  as  consciousness  and  predic‐
tions. Section 6 describes the initialization of behaviours
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that may be related to motivation, and its dynamics that
define intelligence and cognitive  planning.  This  section
also  addresses  the  role  of  the  amygdala  and  how  it
induces  emotions.  In  Section  7,  special  psychological
states, such as hypnosis, sleep and the placebo effect, are
explained  using  the  TnC  framework.  Section  8  briefly
analyses  three  major  diseases  (autism,  Alzheimer’s
disease and schizophrenia), in order to demonstrate the
explanatory  power  of  the  TnC.  Its  predictive  power  is
then tested (Section 9) through the specification require‐
ments  for  a  conscious  robot  based  on  the  TnC  frame‐
work,  demonstrating  that  the  bottleneck  is  not  in
computing  power  anymore,  but  in  the  duration  of  the
learning process (in terms of years).
2. A hierarchy of self-organizing maps
The human cortex [3] is about 0.6 m x 0.6 m in size, and
between 2 to 3 millimetres thick. The number of cortical
neurons is 16 billion (19% of 86 billion). These neurons are
organized in mini-columns of about 110 neurons, which
extend from one side of the cortex to the other (2-3 mm).
About a thousand of these mini-columns form a macro-
column, a functional unit evidenced in 1959 by Nobel
laureates Hubel and Wiesel [4].
In  the  context  of  the  TnC  [5],  we  consider  the  cortex
architecture  to  be  homogeneous  across  its  entire  struc‐
ture.  Each neuron belongs to a  given (macro-)  column,
and  the  cortex  is  made  up  of  only  160,000  cortical
columns.  These  cortical  columns  are  grouped  into
multiple  maps of  several  hundred units.  We know the
functionality  of  many  of  these  maps,  in  particular  the
maps  that  constitute  the  primary  cortex,  whose  name
('primary')  comes  from  the  fact  that  each  of  its  maps
encodes data belonging to only one modality (audition,
smell,  proprioception,  vision,  etc.).  The  maps  that
constitute  the  secondary  cortex  receive  data  from  the
primary  cortical  maps,  and  fuse  data  from  multiple
modalities or dimensions.  What is  left  has been named
the 'associative cortex' (i.e., where 'associations' are made)
and encompasses about 70% of the cortical columns (57%
of  the  total  brain  mass).  Little  is  known  about  the
associative  cortex,  except  that  a  sensory  cortex  can  be
distinguished  from  a  motor  cortex,  as  evidenced  by
Penfield and his  famous sensory and motor 'homuncu‐
lus' 75 years ago [6].
Cortical columns do not bear the physiological limits of
neurons [7]. While a given neuron tires quickly (in a few
tenths of a second), a column with 110,000 neurons does
not. While a neuron can only exhibit a binary state (excited
or not), a 110,000-neuron column may display graded
activation. From now on, we will assume that the cortical
column is the functional unit of cognition.
About 40 years ago, Kohonen [8] proposed a modeliza‐
tion of the cortical map, which became famous under the
name of its inventor: the 'Kohonen map' or 'Self-Organiz‐
ing Map' (SOM). By modelling the fact that neighbour‐
ing  columns  inhibit  each  other,  Kohonen  showed  that
map columns compete: the first to achieve activation wins
and silences the others. The winning column adjusts its
synaptic efficiencies, as do its closest neighbours. These
adjustments follow Hebb's law [9],  a 70-year-old neural
learning  rule  for  which  there  is  increasingly  more
evidence  [10-11].  The  result  of  these  synaptic  weight
modifications  is  to  guarantee  that,  in  the  future,  the
winner  would  win  again  if  the  same conditions  (data)
were applied (i.e., the same inputs into the map). If the
inputs  are  not  identical,  but  similar,  then  either  the
winner wins again, or one of its closest neighbours wins.
Thanks to this behaviour,  the SOM is today one of the
most efficient tools for multidimensional data projection
onto a 2-D surface, since its projection respects both the
topology  of  the  input  space  (multidimensional  neigh‐
bour data are neighbours on the 2-D surface) and data
distribution (the most frequent data are better represent‐
ed on the surface).
Since  the  SOM  models  a  small  part  of  the  cortex,  the
whole  cortex  could  be  said  to  construct  multiple  'opti‐
mal'  2-D  representations  of  the  real  world.  Indeed,
already 80 such maps have been evidenced in the human
brain [12]. Each map is devoted to a particular aspect of
the world situation, taking into account their neighbour‐
hood  properties  (sounds  with  sounds,  images  with
images,  etc.).  What  is  not  a  neighbour  at  one  level  of
abstraction may become a neighbour at a higher level of
abstraction. This possibility is afforded by the hierarchi‐
cal organization of the cortical maps (Figure 1). The idea
that the cortex is  a  hierarchy of  cortical  maps is  by no
means  new.  Many researchers  have  already stated this
fact [13-14], but none have been able to explain how this
hierarchy of memories is able to act, behave, pursue goals,
and  show  intelligence,  motivation  and  consciousness,
which is the aim of the TnC.
The hierarchy is an anatomical and functional one: the
primary cortical maps (layer 1) send their outputs to the
secondary cortical maps (layer 2), which send their output
to the cortical maps of layer 3, etc. The level of abstraction
of a particular map is given by the number of maps that
separate it from the primary cortical inputs.
Figure 1 could be misleading in several aspects. The true
number of layers amounts to more than 10, as evidenced
by the fact that any cognitive task answer requires more
than 130 ms, while the processing undertaken by any one
map (i.e., competition, winning and transmission) is
completed in less than 10 ms. We already know about 80
maps [12]; the TnC proposes that their total number
approximates a few hundred (e.g., 160 maps). Lastly, there
are no cortical maps that could really be labelled 'objects'
or 'words'; however, 'objects that can be seized', 'animals',
'abstract objects', 'orthographic words', etc., are all legiti‐
mate labels.
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Figure 1. A hierarchy of cortical maps accounting for the primary (I),
secondary (II) and associative (III) cortices. Connections are made in both
direction (forward and backward).
3. A memory that acts
In a paper published in 2006 [15], we explained how a
synergy between two cortical maps can generate a robot’s
behaviour instantaneously, without the need for any prior
knowledge of the desired task, and how the robot's
performance improves through the mere repetition of the
behaviour.
3.1 Elementary behaviours
The first  of  these  maps  is  the  situation  map.  The  data
used  for  its  learning  are  the  successive  situations
measured by the robot’s  sensors.  The other  map is  the
situation variation and associated action map. Its learning
data are the successive actions achieved by the robot and
the respective variations of situations that these actions
generate.  In  order  to  instantaneously  synthesize  a
behaviour, one has to set a goal for the robot. This goal
is  a  desired  situation,  i.e.,  a  location  on  the  situation's
map (or sensory map). The experienced situation, at time
t,  is another location on the map. Due to the continuity
representation of the SOM, there exists a trajectory on the
map that  goes from the current  location to the desired
one. This trajectory is almost continuous; therefore, in our
context,  any  two  neighbour  columns  belonging  to  this
trajectory will code for not so different situations (almost
similar). Thus, an action will exist that is able to modify
the experienced situation, in order to change it to the one
coded  by  the  neighbouring  column  (the  intermediate
situation in Figure 2). Having completed the action, the
current situation (at time t+1) will now be the previous
intermediate  situation.  From there,  a  new intermediate
situation is selected (a neighbour of the current one, but
closer  to  the  goal  situation);  the  variation  between  the
current and new intermediate situations is then comput‐
ed and the  second map provides  the  action  needed to
achieve the change in situation. The process is repeated
automatically until the current situation finally becomes
the goal situation.
Figure 2. Two cortical maps cooperate in order to generate a sequence of
actions (i.e., an elementary behaviour) in response to experienced situations.
Each intersection represents a cortical column. The topology of the input
situation space is preserved by the first cortical map (Situation map (1)). The
situation adjacent to the experienced situation and closer to the goal
situation (a) is the intermediate situation (which will have to be reached) in
the process of achieving this 'goal'. The difference between the experienced
and intermediate situations (b) serves as the input to the second map
(Variation of situations and associated action map (2)). Probing an
associative memory (map 2) with information will automatically complete
the information. In this case, it furnishes the action (c) associated with this
variation between situations (i.e., the action that needs to be accomplished
in order to achieve a change from the experienced situation to the inter‐
mediate one).
It is important to mention that activating any cortical
column different to the cortical columns involved in coding
for the currently experienced situation (i.e., the setting of a
goal situation) automatically activates the connected maps.
When one of these maps belongs to the sensorimotor cortex,
this results in actions.
3.2 Complex behaviours
More complex behaviours can be achieved by involving
more than a single pair of sensory and sensorimotor maps.
For example, in order for a mobile robot to fetch a bottle of
water and bring it back to the office (a complex behaviour),
it has to go to the kitchen (a first elementary behaviour –
EB 1), find a bottle (EB 2), grab it (EB 3) and bring it back
(EB 4, which uses the same cortical maps as EB1, but with
a different goal: the office) (Figure 3).
EB 1: One map codes for the x and y locations of the various
rooms, and the second map memorizes the variations
between positions associated with actuator commands.
The experienced situation is the office. The goal situation is
the kitchen. The successive intermediate situations include
the office-corridor door, the corridor, and the corridor-
kitchen door. The actions involve moving from one x-y
position to another, which implies that the office-corridor
door is identified by its x-y coordinates, as is the corridor-
kitchen door, etc. This (elementary) behaviour automati‐
cally stops as soon as the current situation and the goal
situation are identical (i.e., coded by the same cortical
column of the situation map).
EB 2: Once in the kitchen, a second pair of SOMs is activat‐
ed; the first of these maps encodes the objects and their
respective locations in relation to the body (ego-centred).
The robot’s goal is the visual form of a bottle. The second
SOM turns the head around. This behaviour stops as soon
as the bottle is located. The goal (shape of a bottle of water)
has been provided in the initial request (“bring back a bottle
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of water”). The goal of the next behaviour (EB 3) is provided
by EB 2 (i.e., to reach the ego-centred position of the bottle).
EB 3: A third pair of SOMs takes care of the grabbing task:
one map encodes the ego-centred position of the robot
gripper, and the second map elicits the actions needed for
it to reach the desired position. As soon as the bottle has
been grasped, EB 3 is terminated, and the next goal is
provided by the initial request (“bring back to the office”).
EB 4: This behaviour is implemented by the same cortical
maps as EB 1, but the situation-goal is different: it now
codes for the office.
The switching from one pair of SOMs to the next is auto‐
matic: as soon as the experienced situation matches the
desired one, the sensorimotor map is deactivated and the
next pair of SOMs is activated instead. Either the new goal
situation is already known (i.e., given in the initial settings,
for example 'bottle'), or it is provided by the pair that has
just achieved its goal; for example, the ego-centred coordi‐
nates of the bottle (the goal situation for EB 3) are provided
by the EB 2 situation map.
Twenty-five years ago, when he affirmed the 'unity of
remembered experience' in spite of the fragmentation of
memory over multiple maps (with each map devoted to a
particular dimension), Gallistel stated that the various
maps could be coordinated thanks to two very special
indexes: space and time coordinates [16]. Indeed, any event
or situation – whatever the sensory modalities – also
includes a location and a timestamp. Since maps represent
experienced situations (each one associated with a given
pair of time and space coordinates), then the activation of
one map will in turn activate other maps as appropriate,
using these space and time coordinates. Interestingly, in the
brain, space and time coordinates are encoded by the
hippocampus, a structure more or less equidistant to any
given portion of the cortex, and extensively connected to it.
Figure 3. A complex behaviour is the result of several 'elementary'
behaviours (go to the kitchen, find the bottle, grab it)
3.3 Personality
A personality trait refers to the enduring personal charac‐
teristics that are revealed in a particular pattern of behav‐
iours in a variety of situations. Since behaviours are
generated by cortical column activations (situation-goals),
near-permanent situation-goals intervene almost perma‐
nently in our lives. This set of near-permanent cortical
column activations defines our behaviours: our personality
traits.
3.4 Episodic, semantic and implicit memories
Cognitive science partitions (human) memory into several
separate  processes  (declarative,  implicit,  episodic  and
semantic memories), while the TnC sees it as a continuum.
Episodic and semantic memories belong to the category of
declarative memory, which requires conscious recall, and
are  opposed  to  implicit  memory  (no  conscious  recall).
Episodic  memory  refers  to  information  specific  to  a
particular context, and includes its time and place coordi‐
nates, while semantic memory allows for the encoding of
abstract  knowledge  about  the  world  (i.e.,  information
independent of its context). In fact, any piece of informa‐
tion when encountered for the first time is associated with
a date and a location, and belongs to episodic memory (also
called  'autobiographic  memory').  If  this  information  is
encountered again in other locations, then the locations
become harder to memorize, along with the timestamps. If
these time and space indexes do not provide additional
information, they are discarded and the piece of informa‐
tion now belongs to the semantic memory. In this way,
semantic memory is made up of events whose time and
space  indexes  are  irrelevant  to  the  information.  If  this
information continues to be repeated again and again, its
relative frequency will increase, and it will therefore come
to be represented on the lower levels of the SOM hierar‐
chy, ensuring shorter reaction times. With no access, or a
reduced access,  to  the  high-level  maps  that  implement
conscious recall (see Section 5.1), no verbalization will be
associated with these stored events. These events form the
implicit  memory,  which  hosts  'automatic'  reactions
(reflexes).
3.5 Phonological shape of words
Psychomechanics, a linguistic theory formulated by
Guillaume [17], does not agree with the widespread notion
expressed in the phrase “l'arbitraire du signe”, which states
that the phonological shape of words is arbitrary. In
psychomechanics, a word results from a construction by a
speaker with an intention. The meaning of the word
influences its phonological shape. The TnC hypothesizes
that the various elements associated with the meaning of a
word activate pre-existing cortical sensorimotor schemes,
thus determining the word's phonological shape. The only
difference between the TnC and psychomechanics is that
the TnC does not limit targeting to the vocal organs (but
includes all other motor organs, such as legs, hands, etc.).
4. Learning within a hierarchy of SOMs
Neuroplasticity results from neurons changing their
connection patterns in order to maintain a certain level of
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activation – neither too much, nor too little. At the SOM
level, this behaviour translates into weight adjustments in
order to account for data distribution. Since real data are
not uniformly distributed, an SOM will only encode a
certain percentage of the data that reach it. Following the
empirical observation that many natural phenomena
exhibit a Pareto distribution (a power law distribution), we
hypothesize that 80% of the data account for only 20% of
the variations. An SOM will favour the representation of
this 'static' 80% of data (those displaying less intrinsic
variation: only 20% of the total variation), and will have
trouble with the other 20% of data (since it accounts for 80%
of the variation). An SOM will exhibit strong and localized
activity based on any data belonging to these 80%, and
diffuse activity based on other data. Anything 'new' (i.e.,
belonging to the 20%) will not be recognized (i.e., there will
be no specific cortical column activity), and it will therefore
continue on its way towards other (higher-level) maps.
Following this hypothesis, a map located one level above
(level 2) will only receive 20% of the (100%) data received
by the first level maps. A map at level 3 will only receive
4% (20% of 20%) of the data; at level 4, only 0.8% of the data
will arrive. The percentage of data reaching level l is
therefore given by (0.2)l (see Table 1). This means that the
number of data (i.e., learning samples) quickly becomes
very limited, while the process of map self-organization
takes longer. It follows that the training of any cognitive
ability requires a huge amount of time, or a dedicated
learning base that promotes the associations needing to be
represented.
Level l 1 2 3 4 10 12
% 100 20 4 0.8 5 10-5 4 10-7
Table 1. Percentage of input events reaching any given map at level l. The
self-organization of any 'high' level of abstraction therefore requires either
a very long duration or a dedicated learning base.
4.1 How many data are required to organize a given SOM?
The answer to this question requires firstly establishing the
size of the SOM. Using the assumptions already made in
this paper (160,000 cortical columns and 160 maps), we get
a number of 1,000 cortical units per SOM. If we assume the
simplest case of coding, i.e., a one cortical unit/one data,
then at least 1,000 learning data are required. Let us
remember that one-shot learning seldom occurs. Usually,
hundreds of repetitions are required, which puts the
required number of samples (for an SOM) close to one
million (1,000 x 1,000 = 106). If no biases are used, then, in
order to organize a level-10 SOM, an agent must experience
more than a trillion events (106 x 100 / 5 10-5 = 2 1012).
Assuming that the agent is able to sample the environment
at about 25 Hz (since, at this rate, vision is experienced as
continuous while additional frames do not add further
information), to experience a trillion (i.e., a million million)
events, one would need about 31,689 years. We can
therefore conclude that high-level cortical maps are either
much smaller than hypothesized, or the distribution of the
learning samples are biased in favour of their organization.
4.2 Orthographic reading organization
Reading is a complex cognitive ability of tremendous
importance. Its neural organization has been modelled by
Dehaene (in 2005 [18]) and others [19-20]. The model
(Figure 4) involves six cortical maps, starting with the
oriented edges of the primary visual cortex and moving up
to letters, bigrams (i.e., pairs of letters [21]) and words.
Reading is acquired at age five, and the reader’s expertise
depends on the regularity of the language. Highly consis‐
tent languages, such as Spanish, allow their users to read
fluently in a matter of months. On the contrary, with its
numerous exceptions in pronunciation, English requires
two additional years when compared to Spanish.
Figure 4. The cortical organization of reading: a hierarchy of six SOMs
The timing of the various maps’ (self-)organization follows
their abstraction level. For example, it is impossible to
organize the bigram map before the letter map. In order to
achieve an expert level in reading, French pupils spend five
years practising, for dozens of hours per week, which
amounts to an impressive 4,000 hours. An expert reader is
assumed to have mastered about 2,000 words, and is able
to generalize to 5,000 words. This orthographic word
representation map size is therefore in line with our
hypothesis concerning average SOM size (between a few
hundred and several thousand units).
Despite this lengthy duration, the organization of the SOM
does not rely uniquely on self-organization, as evidenced
by the major setback in literacy teaching associated with the
'whole language' paradigm (in the late 1980s to 1990s). This
paradigm differed from the historical phonics method in
that there was no explicit training in the association
between the letters (graphemes) and the letter sounds
(phonemes). To teach such letter-sound associations, the
teacher usually provides many samples of letters and their
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associated sounds, and corrects the pupil until they are able
to master approximately eight new associations per week.
These training samples bias the event distribution, and
represent a kind of supervised training; as long as the
association has not yet been mastered, the pupil has to
correct his/her answer. The organization of level 4 (letters)
within the hierarchical cortical structure of reading is thus
supervised, allowing for an easy organization of the upper
level of pairs of letters (bigrams). However, with the 'whole
language' paradigm, level 4 remained unsupervised,
meaning it would take longer to organize and the organi‐
zation risked being less coherent with upper level require‐
ments (Figure 5).
Figure 5. Additional information helps the organization of levels 4 and 5
when using a phonics method, but not in a 'whole language' method (which
is today banned for lack of efficiency as a method for learning to read).
The self-organization of high-abstraction-level maps
requires a huge number of learning samples, thus necessi‐
tating additional teaching procedures. An efficient method
consists in explicitly learning intermediate representations
useful for the correct organization of high-level represen‐
tations. At the level of the human teacher, such a method
looks like supervised training. At the level of the neural
networks, such a method is not supervised, since the
teacher cannot provide the desired neural coding output,
only a reinforcement signal able to inform the pupil on the
efficiency of his/her production (“good” or “not good”). At
the synaptic level, where only Hebb's law exists, one must
take into account the timing of the synaptic modification to
understand why, in order to learn, it is necessary to repeat
trials until success is achieved.
4.3 Palimpsest learning
The word 'palimpsest' means “scraped clean and used
again”. We apply it to a new learning paradigm which
explains how and why neural networks autonomously
generate attractors around equilibrium states, with no need
for a reference (and therefore no measured error). 'Pal‐
impsest learning' explicitly refers to the duration required
by the synapse to change when it 'memorizes' the co-
activation of the pre- and post-synaptic neurons. Such
modification does not take place instantaneously, but
requires (at least) a few seconds to complete. In many
situations, before the end of this delay, that particular
synapse is solicited again. Two cases are possible here:
either the pre- and post-synaptic neurons are again co-
activated, or only one of the two neurons is activated (no
co-activation). In the latter case, Hebb's law dictates a
decrease in synaptic strength, not as drastic as the increase
would have been, but nevertheless stopping the initial
modification short (and preventing it from ever being
completed). The only complete synaptic modifications are
those that are not shortly followed by any pre- or post-
synaptic neuron activation. In particular, this is the case
when equilibrium is reached, i.e., when the frequency of
changes is particularly low. In this case, the last 'action' of
the neurons is well recorded, and will be easy to replay the
next time the situation is similar. By allowing complete
synaptic modification only for those associations that are
not immediately followed by other actions, this learning
paradigm favours the emergence of equilibriums. When
applied to biology, these equilibriums may be referred to
as 'homeostasis'. The implementation of palimpsest
learning requires time to be taken into account. In a
simulation, an event-driven simulator could be used.
Looking back at the reading model in Figure 5, palimpsest
learning can explain how well-timed additional informa‐
tion (supervision) helps to organize the various cortical
maps.
5. Endogenous and exogenous attention orientation
Attention is the cognitive process of selectively concentrat‐
ing on one aspect of the environment while ignoring others.
It remains a major area of investigation within education,
psychology and cognitive neuroscience. Therefore, it is of
the utmost importance to show how a hierarchy of SOMs
can exhibit attention. In order to make this demonstration,
the concept of consciousness needs to be introduced, since
one has to be conscious of a shift in interest, either through
internally generated processes (endogenous) or external
stimuli (exogenous), in order to ascertain attentional
processes.
5.1 Consciousness
Some of the maps of high-level abstraction represent
elements associated with language (orthographic word
representations, phonetic word representations, objects
that one can grab, animals, verbs, etc.). These maps have
been trained as a result of socialization (feral children do
not master language, and will never do so if found after the
age of seven). This 'training' is mostly provided by the
parents, who – sitting close to the child (baby-sitting) –
frequently comment on events: “the sky is blue”, “are you
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thirsty?”, “you are tired”, etc. There is a timed co-activation
of the parents’ comments with the experienced situations,
which reinforces associations between 'words' and 'events'.
After an extended training period, the child will begin to
reproduce this behaviour automatically and to 'comment
on' the events themselves. In fact, it is only after such a
process of commenting, i.e., activating the maps associated
with language, that a person can know what he/she is
thinking or doing. We consider the behaviour of an agent
devoid of language as 'automatic', animal, or without
consciousness. The philosophical position that considers
consciousness to be just an automatic verbalization of the
experienced situation is called 'eliminative materialism', as
championed by Churchland [22].
5.2 Backward connections
The hierarchy described in Section 4 only features forward
connections between SOMs. From a biological point of
view, this is inaccurate since there are as many 'backward'
connections as there are 'forward' ones. The reason why the
backward connections are usually dismissed, or forgotten,
is that their usefulness is not well understood. If neurons A
and B both fire within the same time-window, then Hebb's
law states that the connection between A and B (A-B) is
reinforced, as is the connection between B and A (B-A). If
A triggers the activation of B, we can easily see the logic of
A-B connection reinforcement, but to reinforce the B-A
connection seems acausal.
What is the effect of this 'acausal' reinforcement? It guar‐
antees that the whole SOM network will function as a large
associative memory. Changes on lower-level SOMs
activate language-level representations, while changes in
language SOMs activate lower-level representations.
Lower and higher activities are coherent which explains
why when you read the words 'pink elephant', this pink
elephant immediately takes on a life of its own: you start to
see it, smell it, hear it, etc. These perceptions are automati‐
cally generated as soon as the words are read, and will also
allow for a faster recognition of the situation if you ever do
encounter a pink elephant. Since your brain now focuses
on this animal, your recognition performance (reaction
time) improves, evidencing your so-called 'endogenous
attention'.
Endogenous attention is only the pre-activation of the SOM
hierarchy, due to language-triggered activities. This pre-
activation is automatic, on account of the causal and acausal
synaptic modifications. The term 'acausal' should now be
dropped since this apparent 'acausality' has been justified.
5.3 Activation trajectory on the SOM
Exogenous attention depends on a different mechanism.
Section 2 emphasized that similar inputs are coded either
by the same or by neighbouring cortical columns. This
guarantees that large areas of the SOM do a continuous
temporospatial transform: the successive experienced
situations establish an activation trajectory on the map
(Figure 6). This is possible because the real world is
continuous (at least, at certain levels of abstraction it is).
Figure 6. Predicted evolution of the experienced situation. (a) and (b) depict
the same map, with and without the neighbourhood drawing.
The fact that, on certain maps, the succession of events
forms a continuous trajectory implies that predictions are
possible. The next event is going to be either identical to the
experienced one, or one that is coded by a close neighbour.
Among the various neighbours, the one that maintains the
continuity of the current trajectory is the logical choice
(Figure 6). This prediction is automatic, in the sense that
neighbour columns are inhibited by the winning column,
which means that their activation will not be possible
(under normal conditions). Higher-level maps will receive
no input relative to this event, if such an event does occur.
If something unpredictable happens, then it is by definition
represented by columns that are not neighbours, and
therefore not inhibited. The activation initiated by this
unpredictable event will proceed to the highest maps – the
language maps. This event will therefore be consciously
experienced (because it will be automatically verbalized).
Exogenous attention is a by-product of the continuous
temporospatial transformation achieved by the cortex, and
the SOMs act as novelty filters (filtering out everything that
conforms to their continuous representations).
6. Motivation and emotions
Motivation is an inner drive to behave or act in a certain
manner. In Section 3, the activation of a goal-situation (i.e.,
a cortical column on a sensory map) automatically gener‐
ates a particular behaviour. The question is this: 'who'
initially specifies the goal-situations? The answer requires
the presentation, in further detail, of the dynamics of
activation within a hierarchy of SOMs.
6.1 Dynamics
Each of the several hundred maps exhibits graded column
activations. Some of these activations may appear constant,
in the sense that they will remain still for a long duration
(seconds), while others will flash (ms). The patterns of
activations are not random, since the connections among
the neurons obey Hebb's law. The patterns represent the
events at the various levels of abstraction, with 'constant'
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activations corresponding to the continuous components
of the events, and transient activations representing the
various intermediate features of the events. A bad, but
instructive, analogy would be that transient activations
represent 'calculus', and continuous activations, the 'result'.
A situation is a collection of events, each belonging to a
specific dimension (such as the five senses). These co-
experienced events are recombined by the hierarchy of
SOMs, in order to extract their correlations. The 'constant'
activations reflect the highest associations discovered by
the system.
Planning (the cognitive ability to reach a goal by selecting
a sequence of thoughts and actions) is automatically
achieved by dynamic relaxation: set the goal (i.e., activate
a particular cortical column of the situation map – the
situation-goal), and then allow the system to relax. As time
passes, various locations on the SOMs will be activated,
which will in turn activate others, etc., until the initial
situation-goal is reached and wiped off. The sequence that
leads to this is the sequence of actions to undertake in order
to achieve the goal.
6.2 Intelligence
Intelligence is a much sought-after component but, follow‐
ing our description, it does not exist per se. Each time a new
association is established between items A and B, it will
involve the de facto activation of a column on a higher-level
map than those maps representing A and B. If this associ‐
ation belongs to an activation pattern that includes lan‐
guage maps, then this new association will be labelled and
verbalized. Thus, the agent becomes aware of this new
piece of knowledge: something 'intelligent' has been
discovered. The adjective 'intelligent' relies completely on
the knowledge of the observer (who could be the agent
himself/herself). The 'new' association may already be
known and, in this case, will not impress the observer, who
will not use the term 'intelligent'; alternatively, it may be
impossible for the observer to understand the new associ‐
ation because he/she lacks the necessary representations of
items A and B. Therefore, intelligence is relative, dependent
on the observer's knowledge. Language is not necessary to
establish higher-level representations, only to become
conscious of them. Therefore, an animal may show intelli‐
gence, but it would have trouble appreciating it.
6.3 Joy or pleasure
When the observer (who can also be the agent himself/
herself) is not able to identify the goal-situation that the
agent is trying to reach (and which generates the successive
actions), then it is assumed that the agent's reason lies in a
personal quest for joy or pleasure. In fact, the notion of joy
only reflects the limited capacities of the observer [23]. The
associative memory nature of the SOM hierarchy guaran‐
tees that, whatever the activation pattern at a given instant,
the dynamics of the hierarchy system will direct it towards
an existing memorized pattern. Memorized patterns make
up only a tiny proportion of the overall number of possible
patterns. The memorized information is therefore based on
the most redundant patterns, i.e., the most shared cortical
column activities: the smallest common activation pattern
[24]. There is always a smallest common activation pattern
behind any situation-goal, which, when not explicitly
labelled, is named 'joy' or 'pleasure' for lack of a better
explanation.
The notion of pleasure encompasses the fact that the agent
will try to repeat the behaviours that have previously led
to pleasure. A situation that exactly matches the smallest
common activation pattern may be experienced from time
to time. Since it is an attractor state (i.e., an equilibrium),
palimpsest learning is very efficient in memorizing the
actions that lead to this final state, facilitating its future
reappearance.
6.4 Emotions
Motivation and emotion are linked, if only because emotion
is often considered the (positive or negative) driving force
behind motivation. An alternative definition of emotion is
a “positive or negative experience that is associated with a
particular pattern of physiological activity”. This definition
is incomplete as long as the positive or negative valence
(neural) mechanism is not explained. A hierarchy of SOMs
processes information at its own pace, which includes
multiple neural steps, each with its own delays. In a
number of situations, the time required to process this
information may be dangerously long, and a faster way to
take action would have been definitively retained through
evolution.
The amygdalae (almond-shaped groups of nuclei located
deep and medially below the cortex) are the only other
brain structure with a cortical organization, and therefore
represent input data on a (cortical-like) map. They are well
connected to the sensory system (including the olfactory
bulb), and send information to many locations, including
the cortex (via the thalamus and hypothalamus) and motor
neuron areas. Because their size is small compared to the
cortex, the processing of information is de facto much faster.
We hypothesize that the amygdala is an early warning
system, able to stimulate immediate avoidance: a survival
mechanism, quick to analyse situations and take action.
Avoidance actions are produced by the activation of
'negative' areas of the amygdalae. Due to their cortical-like
organization, certain neighbouring areas generate a
smaller-sized reaction and can therefore be considered 'less
negative'. Moving further in this direction (over the
amygdalae’s map-like structure), there will be areas
associated with 'no action', and then with actions opposed
to avoidance (e.g., ‘search for’). Let us define these areas as
'positive'. A few of the avoidance (and ‘search for’) actions
may be genetically encoded, but learning also takes place.
Therefore, whatever the particulars of the agent’s life, some
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situations will trigger the negative areas of the amygdala,
and others, the positive areas. The amygdalae’s processing
of the situations will not only result in direct actions, but
will continue to diffuse through the various connected
neural systems, including the cortex. The amygdala
processing is thereby able to impact any aspect of the
cortical processing, yet its actions will remain almost
impossible to describe verbally. The use of vague terms
such as 'mood' or 'fear' is clearly demonstrative of the great
distance (in number of neural processing steps) between
the amygdala and the cortical language maps.
7. Hypnosis, sleep and the placebo effect
A theory must be able to provide explanations for all the
known phenomena that belong to its domain of compe‐
tence. A theory about neural cognition must therefore
describe the neural mechanisms implied by special psy‐
chological states, such as hypnosis [25], sleep and the
placebo effect [26]. Despite numerous attempts, there is still
currently no consensus on any of these questions.
7.1 Hypnosis
Since the world is continuous, there are – between any two
successive instants – only minimal changes in the hierarchy
of the SOMs that represent the associated situations. The
prediction (cf. Section 5.3) allows to verify that these
situation changes are coherent with all previously experi‐
enced and memorized changes (which includes the entire
life of the agent). An error in these predictions will trigger
an activation that will reach higher-level maps (exogenous
attention). If, for reasons detailed later, prediction is
inhibited, then there will be no reference points available
to verify the validity (coherence) of a new pattern of
activations. Whatever the behaviour that matches this new
activation pattern, it will remain in place, unchallenged.
This is the case, for example, when somebody follows the
suggestions of a hypnotist on stage.
Hypnosis uses at least three different methods [27] to
prevent the verification/comparison of the new pattern of
activations (suggestion) with the prediction (control). First,
the hypnotist is able to demonstrate that his/her predictions
are better than the subject's ones, so that the subject
'voluntarily' (and momentarily) discards his/her erroneous
prediction. This may be achieved with the use of ideomotor
movements, usually unknown to the subject but predicted
and evidenced by a specific exercise suggested by the
hypnotist. A second technique involves 'confusion'. The
hypnotist overloads the subject’s cognitive capabilities
until his/her pattern of activations is completely off-track;
the hypnotist then suggests something easy to understand
(which matches known patterns). This new pattern will
therefore stick and become the (new) state of the system. A
third technique consists in inducing a 'pattern break'. The
hypnotist interrupts the subject right in the middle of a
well-automatized routine, such as a handshake, and inserts
a suggestion. Here, the routine belongs to implicit memory,
which prevents any conscious awareness (i.e., no organized
high-level pattern of activations). This explains why the
new high-level pattern induced by the suggestion will
never be challenged.
7.2 Sleep
The purposes and mechanisms of sleep are only partially
clear and subject to substantial ongoing research. Hebb's
law states that co-activation reinforces the common
synapses, and conversely, that uncorrelated neurons will
see a reduction in the strength of their shared synapses.
Since efficient inhibitory synapses forbid (de facto) the
activation of the target neuron, the efficiency of these
inhibitory synapses decreases over time. However, since
the plasticity of the inhibitory synapse has been demon‐
strated [28], a mechanism must exist that impedes or
restores the efficiency of such synapses. Through Hebb's
law, such a restoration is possible if both neurons (neuron
A, and neuron B (the target of the inhibitory synapse)) are
firing together. This is exactly what happens during slow-
wave sleep (non-rapid eye movement or NREM sleep),
when cortical electro-encephalography has measured
high-amplitude waves at less than 3.5 Hz (delta activity).
These depolarization waves reflect the coherent behaviour
of a large number of neurons firing together and therefore
strengthening the connections they share, in particular
local inhibitory ones.
It must be noted that NREM sleep affects excitatory long-
distance connections, reducing their efficiency, because
long-distance activation is forbidden. These excitatory
long-distance connections are the ones that link distant
maps, that ground the associations or the 'intelligent'
discoveries made during the day, and establish links
between various aspects of reality. In order to smoothen the
effects of local (inhibitory) reinforcement, NREM sleep is
followed by REM sleep (also known as paradoxical sleep),
during which activity looks very similar to that of the
awake state. REM sleep activity involves replaying the
day’s activity, only about 20 times faster, and not in the
same order [29-30]. During the night, NREM and REM
sleeps follow each other, so that when the subject wakes up,
inhibitory connection strengths are replenished, while
excitatory long-distance connection strengths are main‐
tained.
This model of the neural basis of sleep [31] explains why
cognitive performance levels fall during the day. In fact,
they are related to local inhibition efficiency between
cortical columns. In the morning, efficiency is strong and
guarantees that only one cortical column is activated at a
time (i.e., no neighbouring columns). At the end of the day,
activation on an SOM may involve several neighbour
columns, which results in a fuzzier representation of the
situation, and a less precise behavioural response. This also
explains why every animal must sleep, why sleep must
occur (under penalty of death), why one needs a recovery
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sleep after staying awake longer than usual, and why sleep
debt results in diminished high-level cognitive functions.
7.3 The placebo effect
The placebo effect has been controversial throughout
history, and still is; this is a sure sign that it has not been
understood. Today, placebos are considered unethical
despite their proven healing ability. A placebo is a sub‐
stance (e.g., a sugar pill), or a (sham) procedure, which
should have no action since it “is objectively without
specific activity for the condition being treated“ [32].
Plenty of effort has been invested in attempting to prove
that placebos are, or are not, effective under a tremendous
variety of health conditions. Tests have even been conduct‐
ed on animals, such as dogs, and turned out positive [33].
The results show that the placebo effect is highly variable
in its magnitude and reliability, and depends on the form,
colour and price of the placebo, and on the country. One
individual may respond to a placebo, while another may
not. Studies attempting to relate this difference to the
personality of the individuals remain inconclusive [34].
Evolutionary medicine – the goal of which is to understand
why people get sick – points out that many of the conditions
we prefer to avoid as much as possible (such as fever, pain
and behaviours related to sickness) are in fact symptoms of
the body’s response to infection or injury, and should not
be fought. These symptoms have neural causes, either
directly or indirectly, through the (neural) activation of the
endocrine and immune systems. Having neural causes,
these conditions can probably be stifled by another neural
activity pattern. High-level maps encode the understand‐
ing that a pill (placebo) improves one’s condition, drawing
on previous experiences with effective pharmacological
substances, or previous descriptions of their efficacy (either
by a trusted person, or direct-to-consumer pharmaceutical
advertising (DTCPA)). This (high-level map) coding
represents a better state of health. It synchronizes with low-
level map activation patterns through backward connec‐
tions (described in Section 5.2). The low-level activation
patterns act upon the various systems, in order to bias the
condition towards the expected one. The clearer the
description one has of one’s future improvement, the
greater the placebo effect. The recent increase in the placebo
effect among the US population can be linked to the
legalization of DTCPA in 1997.
8. Autism, Alzheimer’s disease and schizophrenia
Diseases such as autism, Alzheimer’s disease and schizo‐
phrenia represent test cases for the explanatory power of
the TnC. Taken together, they extend throughout a large
spectrum of the population: autism is generally diagnosed
early (in 18- to 24-month-old children), affects four boys for
every one girl, and is displaying an increasing prevalence
(2.6% of the 18- to 24-months-old-children in 2011 in South
Korea); Alzheimer's disease primarily affects senior people
(one in ten at 60 years of age; one in four at 80 years); and
schizophrenia is typically diagnosed in young adulthood,
and affects a little over 0.5% of the population worldwide
[35]. Experiences associated with schizophrenia, and
related categories such as paranoid delusional thinking and
auditory hallucinations, are observed in an attenuated form
in 5-8% of healthy people [36].
8.1 Autism
The diagnosis of autism is based on behaviour (i.e., not
cause or mechanism [37]), with typical symptoms includ‐
ing impairments in social interaction, impairments in
communication, restricted interests, and repetitive behav‐
iour. LeBlanc and Fagiolini have proposed that alterations
in the expression and/or timing of critical-period circuit
refinements in primary sensory brain areas may signifi‐
cantly contribute to the autistic phenotype [38]. During a
critical period, the neuroplasticity of a neural circuit (such
as a cortical map) is improved, allowing for quick organi‐
zation. Outside of these critical periods, neuroplasticity is
impeded; it may still exist but not at the same scale. This is
in accordance with a hierarchy of SOMs, with each level
starting to organize as soon as the previous levels are
organized. A disruptor, acting at any level, will dramati‐
cally impact higher-level performance. In the case of face-
processing impairment, one of the most studied items in
autism, Vlamings et al. have shown that lower-order visual
deficits could impair higher-order visual processing of
faces [39].
Kuhlman et al. have reported the induction of a new critical
period, able to restore ocular dominance plasticity in the
primary visual cortex [40]. This ability to interfere with the
time course of critical periods may become a major tool in
autism therapy. Repetitive behaviours are another report‐
ed characteristic of autism. The TnC states that, if the
situation-goal that generates the behaviour is not correctly
extinguished when the goal is achieved, the behaviour will
start again. The failure to wipe off the situation-goal may
be due to unbalanced excitatory-inhibitory networks [40]
(i.e., failed map self-organization).
8.2 Alzheimer's disease (AD)
AD is a neurodegenerative disorder with no cure. Mental
stimulation [42-43], exercise and a balanced diet have been
reported to delay cognitive symptoms. AD is characterized
by two factors: neural death and senile plaques. Neural
death may reach as much as 50% to 70% in certain brain
areas before cognitive symptoms allow for the diagnosis of
the disease. This is a strong demonstration of the efficiency
of neuroplasticity. The senile plaques of amyloid beta
prevent electrical conduction, negatively impacting long-
distance excitatory connections. The loss of autobiographic
memory is today the major element to suspect AD. The TnC
states that autobiographic memory is the most fragile (see
Section 3.1), since the unity of remembered experiences
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requires time and space indexes. Interestingly, AD patients
are no more prone to the placebo effect. This could stem
from their inability to predict/visualize a healthy state for
themselves, which is a function of autobiographic memory.
8.3 Schizophrenia
Schizophrenia is a very particular disease, with episodes of
psychosis that last several weeks, separated by longer
periods (several months) of recovery. The TnC describes
'personality' as the set of fixed (or constant) situation-goals
among high-level SOMs (cf. Section 3.3). The TnC hypothe‐
sizes that an excessively small radius of inhibition around
the cortical columns may result in a larger number of
situation-goals, leading to antagonistic goals (i.e., incom‐
patible goals). Since the activation generated by a situation-
goal only stops when the goal is achieved, the patient will
experience a higher level of global activation, which may
lead to illusions, cognitive impairment or catatonia.
Illusions are 'abnormal' activations, but they cannot be
differentiated from normal activations (which is the reason
why they should not be dismissed, as advocated by May
[44]). Catatonia is the result of an incapacity to take action.
The patient's personality (Section 3.3) has no situation-goal
that stands out from the mass, and he/she is therefore
incapable of acting.
The success of cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) in
schizophrenia [45-46] is based on its goal-oriented, explicit
systematic procedures. CBT offers training to the 'person‐
ality' maps by defining new situation-goals, and providing
numerous rehearsals to anchor them. It creates strong
enough situation-goals to decrease catatonia and, by
favouring a reduced and limited number of situations-
goals, reduces the frequency of hallucinations.
The efficiency of antipsychotic medication (which blocks
dopamine function) can be explained as a reduction in the
global activation of the system: fewer situation-goals are
active at any time. This also explains why antipsychotics
have no effect over catatonia symptoms, and why, by
reducing the speed of activation, they impede cognitive
performance.
9. Building an intelligent and conscious robot companion
The TnC states that 'intelligent' is a qualification given to
an agent (which can be ourselves), as soon as a new
association is made that includes verbalization maps. The
TnC also states that automatic verbalization provides a
strong illusion of consciousness (to all observers, including
ourselves). For a robot to be considered 'intelligent', it need
only be able to show new associations to humans – associ‐
ations that can be considered 'clever'. A robot need only be
able to verbalize its internal states (i.e., its cortical column
activations) to appear 'conscious'. In order to do so, the
robot’s hierarchy of SOMs must code information that we
– humans – will understand. These maps must be organ‐
ized by data that belong to our 'world' (i.e., colours, smells,
sounds, speed, size, etc., must all agree with our human
sensing abilities). This requires that the robot’s representa‐
tions of the world must make use of equivalent sensors. For
the same reason, the robot should also be of similar size,
strength, shape, etc., to a human. It should also be 'humani‐
form' (i.e., with legs, arms, head, bilateral symmetry, etc.).
These constraints on the robot’s body structure must be
complemented by similar constraints relative to its internal
clock speed (i.e., identical to that of a human when speak‐
ing, listening and thinking).
Using the TnC, an 'intelligent' robot’s cognitive abilities
should be close to those of a human; however, in order to
achieve the same (self-)organization, this robot needs to
benefit from the same learning data. It must be 'robot-sat'
exactly as a baby is – a humaniform shape will certainly add
to the necessary anthropomorphization [47]. One should
also be prepared for several years of daily training before
it is able to achieve child-level cognitive performances,
several more years for teenager cognition, and several more
years before this robot recognisably behaves as an adult. It
may never clearly demonstrate 'intelligence' by teaching
humans something they don't already know, but how
many humans qualify for this?
The typical questions concerning super-intelligent robots
gone wrong, such as in the case of The Terminator, are not
relevant here, since the robot brain (just like the human
brain) will only represent its experienced situations.
Having been educated within human society, such a robot
will be no more than 'human'. In order to develop a super-
robot, one must be able to provide it with the required
('super') training data. A potential solution to this issue is
to have the robot live and learn for a very long time, far
exceeding a normal human lifespan.
Section 7.2 explains why such a robot will not require sleep
(its local inhibition strengths will never change), which
may help cut its learning duration by half (it could experi‐
ence the world and human society both day and night).
However, it would seem difficult to accelerate its learning
any further. We don't know of any solution concerning how
to use several robots in parallel and to merge their individ‐
ual learning from time to time [48]. The distributed
representation of the situations over the whole hierarchy of
SOMs forbids it.
Today, commercially available humaniform robots exist,
with sensors and actuators that match human capacities to
a certain degree. However, their computational power is
too limited. The TnC estimates the necessary cognitive
units to be about 160,000, with an update frequency of
about 25 Hz. This does not take into account the processing
at the sensor locations, such as the eyes (100 millions pixels,
with only 1 million fibres leading to the brain), but dedi‐
cated hardware are commercially available that implement
similar rates of data processing (e.g., neuromorphic chips).
The computational requirement for a TnC-based robot is
only about 4 GFLOPS (1.6 105 x 25 x 1000), assuming 1,000
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connections per cortical unit. This could easily be provided
by a few Intel Pentium 4 microprocessors, which could be
WIFI-connected to the robot.
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